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Poverty, precarious work, and the COVID-19 pandemic: 
lessons from Bolivia
Bolivia is one of the poorest countries in Latin 
America with a gross domestic product of around 
US$3500 per capita, health spending of approximately 
$220 per capita, a labour market dominated by informal 
work, and a weak health system. However, in the 
response to COVID-19, Bolivia has fared better than 
other health systems in the region and provides insight 
with regard to the implementation of subnational non-
pharmaceutical interventions and supporting workers 
without social protection.
The Bolivian Government confirmed the first case 
of COVID-19 in the country on March 10, 2020, and 
responded quickly by cancelling events, closing schools 
and borders, and implementing a national lockdown 
on March 22, 2020. However, the Bolivian Government 
was under pressure to open the economy in an election 
season. In response, the Bolivian Government shifted 
responsibility for most non-pharmaceutical interventions 
to departmental and municipal governments on 
June 1, 2020. The Bolivian Government maintained a 
mask mandate, school and border closures, and a nightly 
curfew, while allowing departmental and municipal 
governments to set workplace, social gathering, 
population mobility, and public transit policies. Daily 
deaths from COVID-19 increased markedly from 20 on 
June 1, 2020, to 96 on Aug 1, 2020.1
Subnationally, the first outbreak of severe acute 
respiratory syndrome coronavirus 2 (SARS-CoV-2) 
occurred in the wealthy, politically conservative 
department of Santa Cruz, followed by the poor, 
politically moderate department of Beni in May, 2020. 
These two departments maintained strict confinement 
policies in June, 2020, to manage outbreaks. Strict 
policies were also maintained in the wealthy, 
politically conservative department of Tarija, while 
the other six departments relaxed restrictions quickly 
in June, 2020, and subsequently a surge in cases was 
observed. In response to an increase in deaths in June 
and July, 2020, Chuquisaca and Cochabamba reinstated 
some restrictions and the other departments shifted to 
a policy of isolating municipalities with outbreaks. Daily 
deaths began to decline in August, 2020, decreasing to 
35 per day by Sept 15, 2020.1
The Bolivian Government announced a post-
confinement phase on Sept 1, 2020, and subsequently 
all departments began to relax containment strategies. 
A national mask mandate, nightly curfew, school 
closure, event ban, and border closure were maintained 
while allowing most workplaces and transportation to 
open with restricted hours and distancing protocols. 
Departments differed with regard to opening hours of 
businesses, the level of intermunicipal transportation, the 
size of gatherings, and local enforcement. The relaxation 
of restrictions in some departments coincided with 
the nationwide surge in COVID-19 deaths in June and 
July, 2020. However, deaths declined in September and 
October, 2020, despite the post-confinement relaxation.
Informality, inequity, and overlapping health 
disparities and pre-existing conditions of specific groups 
are systemic and persistent issues that amplified the 
impact of the pandemic and explain outcomes observed 
across the country. In the poorest departments, deaths 
in July, 2020, were more than seven times higher than 
that in July, 2019.2 In comparison, the peak of deaths in 
the wealthiest departments were only two times higher 
than that in the same period in 2019.
More than 70% of working Bolivians do not have 
employment contracts or employer-based social 
security3 making strict containment especially difficult 
to achieve. National and departmental containment 
laws designated market, transportation, and agricultural 
labourers as essential workers,4 despite informal, open-
air, street markets being identified as sites of contagion. 
Employment in these sectors continued amid a shortage 
of personal protective equipment (PPE) and testing. 
Departmental and municipal governments implemented 
mask and glove mandates, but these low-income 
workers were expected to source and purchase their own 
PPE and tests. COVID-19 cases were concentrated in 
these informal workplaces. In Cochabamba, market and 
transportation workers and their families account for 
40–50% of confirmed COVID-19 cases despite low levels 
of testing among these groups.5
The national government expanded benefits 
for existing cash transfer programmes in late 
March, 2020, and extended income transfers to 
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previously unprotected workers.6 Although such 
programmes represent a welcome anti-poverty 
policy, electronic distribution was impossible, benefits 
were collected in-person, and crowds formed at the 
distribution sites. The absence of strict social distancing 
protocols further increased health risk.
Bolivia highlights the importance of labour market 
structures for understanding the spread of SARS-CoV-2 
(panel). Non-salaried, unprotected workers and their 
families have been disproportionately affected by the 
COVID-19 pandemic. These groups are vulnerable for 
multiple reasons: their work requires close contact 
with the public and each other without PPE; their 
living spaces are overcrowded without access to clean 
water; and most workers do not have health and 
unemployment insurance.6
Informal workers’ organisations could be a crucial 
route for the government to respond to workers’ short-
term needs while addressing larger systemic issues.7 
Bolivia has previously used these groups for health 
policy enforcement, advocacy for workers’ needs, and 
distribution of PPE. However, to date, Bolivia has missed 
an important opportunity to partner with workers’ 
unions and civil society organisations to deliver health 
services, implement non-pharmaceutical interventions, 
and reach vulnerable populations.
Bolivia, despite being a relatively small country with a 
population of around 11 million, mirrors the dynamics 
of COVID-19 in larger countries including Mexico, Brazil, 
Canada, and the USA: variation in subnational non-
pharmaceutical intervention is key to understanding a 
country’s response to the pandemic.8,9 Understanding 
such variation might also provide essential insight with 
regard to the evolution of COVID-19 since subnational 
non-pharmaceutical intervention might be both a cause 
of, and a reaction to, deaths from COVID-19.
Similar to Bolivia, many low-income and middle-
income countries face the combined, structural 
challenges of poverty, inequity, and precarious work that 
require a syndemic approach.10 Governments struggle 
to provide employment-based crisis relief and enforce 
health policy when most people work informally. This 
has been a challenge throughout Latin America to 
which few countries have responded with effective 
income supports, non-pharmaceutical intervention 
implementation, or strategies for re-opening. 
Subnational policy making, combined with effective 
national testing and vaccination strategies, will be key to 
outbreak management, safe re-opening of the economy, 
and relief from pandemic-induced poverty.
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Panel: Lessons from Bolivia
The approaches used in Bolivia to deal with the COVID-19 pandemic are instructive for 
several reasons, and can be applied to many countries around the world, especially low-
income countries.
A high proportion of the Bolivian population are affected by unequal, precarious working 
conditions and poverty, which creates multiple, overlapping vulnerabilities and systemic 
issues that exacerbate the impact of the pandemic and complicate public policy 
responses. Similar to many other low-income and middle-income countries, these 
overlapping issues require a syndemic approach.
In Bolivia, non-pharmaceutical interventions were combined with income supports targeted 
at workers at risk of impoverishment, but the safe delivery of such interventions was 
challenging. Although income support is a crucial part of pandemic relief, their delivery must 
be carefully orchestrated and organised in ways that do not further endanger health–eg, 
through electronic delivery of funds that do not require beneficiaries to be present in-person.
Policy making at the subnational level has been a crucial aspect of the pandemic response 
in Bolivia and many other countries around the world. Ideally, local ministries of health 
should operate under the umbrella of effective national stewardship of public health 
policy to ensure a robust response to COVID-19. Where national responses are slow or 
inadequate, local governments must act quickly in the absence of federal support to 
implement or maintain non-pharmaceutical intervention where they have jurisdiction.
Bolivia has a long history of delivering public services in cooperation with workers’ unions 
and other civil society groups, yet the Bolivian Government has not engaged these groups 
to reach vulnerable populations during the COVID-19 pandemic. Governments should 
apply a multisectoral, interinstitutional approach that harnesses all available formal and 
informal networks and non-governmental actors to protect their citizens and combat the 
COVID-19 pandemic.
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